

Weekly Bulletin

Issue 10, 7 September 2005, review of 30 August – 6 September 2005

The Bulletin is published in the framework of the “Early Warning for Violence Prevention” Project

The information in this bulletin is intended for use by individuals and organizations willing to make a peaceful intervention in a particular conflict situation. The Early Warning Center strives to provide accurate information while disseminating information timely to make prevention and early intervention possible. A variety of sources are used, including eyewitnesses, mass media, civil society representatives, officials and other knowledgeable people.

In this issue:

1. “Alerts”
 2. Weekly review
 3. Trends and expectations
 4. Special report: growing dissatisfaction with the hiring policy of the authorities
 5. Recommendations
 6. Brief summary of events and trends in August 2005
 7. Announcements
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1. Alerts

This week “alerts” occurred in Osh and Kara-Suu cities following the assassination of the former director of Karasuu market and subsequent demonstrations in these two cities.

2. Weekly review

- On August 29, an alleged **activist of the forbidden radical party “Hizb-ut-Tahrir”** was **arrested** in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The citizen of Kyrgyzstan, born in 1961, was distributing leaflets of extremist content near the regional hospital, according to information from news agency “Obshestvenniy reiting”. According to law enforcement bodies of Osh oblast, another distributor of leaflets was arrested near the market of Karasuu city. His identity is being determined. Earlier, intensified activities of Islamic religious groups were observed in Issyk-Kul oblast (see bulletin issue 8).
- On September 2, in Jalalabad oblast, a group consisting of at least 40 people, positioning themselves as active participants of March events, gathered at the Jalalabad city administration building, and expressed **dissatisfaction with hiring policies** that allow employees who worked in the city administration during the presidency of Akaev A. to remain in their posts. The protesters demand a reward for their participation and remind a number of officials, who regained posts in the local state administration, about their pro-Akaev actions (for example, the former press-secretary of the oblast administration, Karasartov O.).
- As scheduled, another action by **land claimants** took place on September 2 in front of the Oktyabr akimiyat building, from morning up to 12:00. Approximately 150 people participated. The akim of

the rayon, Isaev J., came out of the building for a dialogue with protesters, which took place in a tense atmosphere. A clear result regarding the demands of land claimants has not been achieved.

- During the night of September 4/5, **Abdalim Junusov, former manager of Karasuu market, the largest market in the Fergana Valley, was shot.** He died that night in his house as a result of unprovoked gunshot attacks by unknown persons. His bodyguard was also killed. Junusov A., headed the national movement for handing over of the Karasuu market to “the people”. Following the upheavals that took place after March, Karasuu market was managed by a national trust group headed by Junusov A. Two months ago he handed over the management of the market to the state authorities, and became involved in legal proceedings related to the legal registration of the management of the market. It is widely known that until March, Karasuu market was controlled by parliament member, Erkinbaev B.
- The day after the assassination, on September 5, at about 11.00 a.m. approximately 150 **supporters of the murdered Junusov Abdalim conducted protest actions** at market “Turatali” in Karasuu city, demanding the immediate capture and punishment of the murderers. A little later, at about 14.00 p.m. nearly 100 people came to the Osh oblast state administration building to also protested against Junusov’s assassination. According to protesters, the criminal case on the shooting at the “Alai” hotel had to be considered on September 5. Following Junusov’s murder, the court session had to be postponed. People, who were to be witnesses in this case, came to the oblast state administration to protest, because they consider that the “court proceedings connected with Bayaman Erkinbaev, were extended intentionally”. The acting governor of oblast, Anvar Artykov, arrived to engage into dialogue with the protesters and assured them that murderers will be punished (www.pr.kg – 05/09/05).
- On September 6 **in Osh and Karasuu a meeting took place** that was attended by acting Vice-Prime-minister A. Madumarov, the Secretary of Security Council M. Niyazov, Osh oblast Governor A. Artykov, Deputy Governor K. Tezekbaev and General Prosecutor A. Beknazarov. The meeting was attended by approximately 2000 people, according to information of the project. During the meeting the following remarkable points were noted: a) open criticism by General Prosecutor A. Beknazarov directed at acting vice-prime-minister A. Madumarov and Secretary of the Security Council M. Niyazov because the latter came to the meeting alone, despite of an agreement to join the meeting together; b) public speech by Mr. Aidar Bekmurzaev, a native of Korul village (Alay rayon, Osh oblast) who was previously convicted and considered as a prominent criminal figure. A. Bekmurzaev provoked a fight with the bodyguards of A. Beknazarov during Beknazarov’s speech and promised that his team will itself take care of investigation and tracing of the murderer(s) and planner, if law enforcement agencies are not successful; c) General Prosecutor A. Beknazarov had to listen to accusations of having accepted \$500,000 bribe from B. Erkinbaev in return for closing the prosecution case on the Alay hotel shootings, and of being a “betrayor of people and advocate of murderers”; d) people demanded the resignation of Osh oblast governor A. Artykov; and e) the deputy governor K. Tezekbaev called for revenge – “blood for blood”.

3. Trends and expectations

The week from August 30 till September 6 was marked by unrest in Osh and Karasuu, related to the assassination of the ex-director of Karasuu market, A. Junusov. A continuation of existing conflicts has been observed. The following trends, already early reported, are also observed this week: 1) growing dissatisfaction with the hiring policy of the authorities, 2) series of protests against managers of enterprises; 3) continued activity of religious-political groups in the country; and 4) an increase of influence of criminal elements in the country. There is a possibility of a new trend, namely open participation of criminals in political affairs.

Last week, many Parliament staff and journalists noticed that the security of the Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh, Omurbek Tekebaev was visibly strengthened. According to rumors, the **additional measures to provide security** to the speaker of Parliament are connected with his strong statements on August 24 at the Security Council about the necessity to strengthen the fight against organized crime in the country. Behind the closed doors of the Security Council meeting, inaccessible to journalists and the general public, Tekebaev and General Public Prosecutor, Beknazarov, spoke of some government officials with sharp criticism, mentioning their connections to criminal elements, and about jointly carrying out public actions.

Decline in the opportunities in tourism around Issyk-Kul Lake prompts local residents to develop another type of activity – **cultivation and gathering of hemp for production of marijuana and hashish**. No attempts to export the processed narcotic product have been observed. On the contrary, regular arrivals of buyers from Russia and Kazakhstan under the pretence of tourists have been observed. They come not only to the tourist areas of Cholpon-Ata and Bosteri, but also to the remote villages of Tyup, Ton and Aksu rayons. This type of activity has proven profitable as it allows local residents to build or buy large pieces of real estate and to educate their children in institutes of higher education in Bishkek. Taking into consideration the growth of opium poppies in the eastern part of Issyk-Kul oblast, there is a possibility to start opium production in underground laboratories under the control of criminal groups. The proximity of the southern capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, as a possible transit point and market for distribution could be a major factor for promoting opium production. To date, there have been confrontations between local residents and employees of the law enforcement bodies, two of which have led to severe knife wounds to policemen. This happened when policemen attempted to detain people who were gathering hemp. According to the head of the department on combating drugs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Orozakunov T., the local population has firearms at their disposal (www.iwpr.net – 05/09/05). Confrontation between employees of law enforcement bodies and local residents are becoming regular.

In addition to **intra-industrial conflicts** of joint-stock cotton company “Kyrgyzkhlopok”, the Railroad Department and Kara-Keche, all connected with the replacement of management and/or owners and protest actions, a conflict occurred at **Tokmok Kyrgyz-Chinese paper-mill**. The staff of the factory, about 50 people, announced to begin protest actions in the near future, in order to remove the director Eldibai Bazakechev. According to information obtained by project staff, the staff of the paper-mill expresses dissatisfaction with the property management of the factory, dismissals and the attitude to employees – for which the director is responsible. Furthermore, the director has employed his relatives in staff positions, which were already occupied by others. 72 % of shares of the paper-mill belong to the Government of KG, and 28 % to the Chinese state bodies. It is known that the Chinese counterpart of the management left the factory in February 2005.

Information updates:

- **Barskoon**: the duration of the work of the state commission on investigation of complaints and appeals by residents of Barskoon village has been prolonged by a month. Among demands were to begin a criminal investigation of the responsibility for the accident during which cyanide was spilled in Barskoon river in 1998, and to award the status of “suffered from ecological catastrophe” to five villages (see also Bulletin No. 8).
- **Land claimants in Osh**: The problem of land plots and housing in Osh remains as acute as in Bishkek, due to internal migration. What differentiates the land claimants in Osh is that, besides lands, land claimants seized dormitories. During the March events the vacant dormitories of former professional colleges and other middle educational institutions were seized. According to the press secretary of the Osh city mayor, Matisakov B., the legal status of the buildings is unclear.
- **Refugees**: On September 3, the Office of General Public Prosecutor of Uzbekistan made a statement about “the tarnished reputation” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan. It was stated that “according to confidential information received from reliable sources, Zafar Khakimov, director of the department of migratory service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan,

made a deal with a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees demanding a considerable amount of money for allowing refugees to leave to a third country” (www.pr.kg – 03/09/05). Up to the present moment, neither the Office of the Public Prosecutor nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this statement. In an interview conducted by project staff, a UNHCR officer unofficially said that an official reaction of UNHCR will be released by the UNHCR Headquarters; he also added that UNHCR funding does not include money for operations mentioned in the statement of the General Prosecution Office of Uzbekistan.

- **Railroad:** Although on August 18 the group of railroad workers voluntary stopped their protest actions and hunger strike that lasted for about four months, railroad workers still express dissatisfaction with the current situation regarding the Kyrgyz railroad. In that respect, on August 30, Ernis Dokenov, chairman of the opposition trade union “Rabprofsozh” (the official trade union is headed by Mazitov R.) informed at a press conference in “AKIpress”, that the director of State Enterprise “National Company Kyrgyz Temir Joldoru”, Isaev K., made an agreement that causes economic damage to the Kyrgyz railroad, by deliberately increasing the amount to be payed to joint-stock company “Severelektro” by the sum of 4.043.195 soms. In addition, Dokenov E., made a statement that the Kyrgyz railroad must voluntary give money to “Potential” Ltd. instead of giving to “Severelektro”, according to the tripartite agreement of August 16 between “Potential” Ltd., State Enterprise “Kyrgyz Temir Joldoru” and public joint-stock company “Severelektro” as well as according to the bilateral agreement of August 18 between “Potential” Ltd. and State Enterprise “Kyrgyz Temir Joldoru”. Dokenov E. also noted that President Bakiev K. did not possess reliable information and that Bakiev K. thought that the action of hunger strikes by railroad workers was designed with the intent to destabilize the society. In addition, Dokenov E. said that the railroad workers are still waiting for a decision by the President.

According to the statement by Dokenov E., “third forces” are involved with the Department of the Kyrgyz Railroad in the form of people linked to the National Security Service of the Kyrgyz Republic. From August 11, when railroad workers had already stopped their hunger strike, these third forces started to put open pressure upon people from Dokenov’s trade union, and upon others who opposed the Department. The main person applying this pressure, according to Dokenov E., was Alymkulov Kuban, former head of the department on the combat against economic crimes of the National Security Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, who today heads the security service of the railroad. Dokenov E. stated that people from the National Security Service threatened him and other members of his trade union (including Kerimbekova Gulnara, who had threatened to commit self-immolation but was convinced not to do so), and also offered money. One member of Dokenov’s trade union was beaten up on August 30 at 3 p.m. near his house by unknown persons and has been admitted to hospital. Furthermore, Dokenov E. told staff of the project that employees of the National Security Service had recorded the hunger strikers on video. Police officers of 9th district of the Department of Internal Affairs in Bishkek, who were protecting hunger strikers in August, warned protestors that they were recorded on video by employees of National Security Service who had presented themselves as a group of TV correspondents.

4. Special report: growing dissatisfaction with the hiring policy of the authorities

Within the last three weeks a trend of growing dissatisfaction with the current state leadership has been observed, in particular in relation to hiring policy.

A whole range of appointments caused various reactions in political circles and in society as a whole. Among others, in the southern regions reactions were observed in connection with the pro-Akaev past of some political figures and/or with the structuring of activities in Akaev’s style. In particular this considered the appointments for the post of acting head of the Prime Minister’s Administration, Kasiev N., and a range of acting members of Government as well as several acting governors (who were prominent figures in governmental structures during the Presidency of Akaev).

Reactions from the regions are usually expressed against a background of dissatisfaction with the realization of the tasks set by the local community to the heads of rayon or oblast levels.

- The demand by residents of 5 villages of Jeti-Ozug rayon for the replacement of the governor of Issyk-kul oblast in connection with the ongoing investigation by a state commission of the cyanide spill in Barskoon river (www.akipress.kg - 05/09/05);
- According to information obtained by the project, residents of Jumgal rayon, who participated in the capture of the Open-pit Coal Mine in Kara Keche, take a hard line against prime-minister Kulov F., because he signed the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic of August 17, 2005, № 374 (see Bulletins No. 8 and 9);
- Another group of residents has taken a hard line against the governor of Osh oblast, Artykov A., in connection with their dissatisfaction over his hiring policy and by the state of his relationship with the local self-governments (see bulletin No. 7).

At the level of Ayil Okmotu, the system of decentralization of power starts to show signs of failure. First of all this is reflected in the form of permanent conflicts between separate groups of the population and heads of Ayil Okmotu concerning the distribution of agricultural land. In the near future struggles between local state (mainly rayon) administrations and local self-governments as well as between potential heads of local level will most likely take place. This will be over such a powerful political lever as responsibility for distribution of the land. This factor possibly explains the letter addressed earlier by the acting governor of Jalalabad oblast, Jeenbekov J, to the government, with the request to reconsider the legislation of Kyrgyzstan on local self-government “in connection with the complexity of dismissal heads of Ayil Okmotu from their posts” and with the proposal “to enlarge the territory of Ayil Okmotus and the subsequent appointment of their heads” (www.akipress.kg – 30/08/05). In this case, the desire of local administrations to concentrate hiring policy in their hands is observed; nevertheless it is difficult to say whether this is a trial balloon by the state government or an initiative from the local level. This tendency of efforts of the rayon administrations to strengthen their authority is felt especially strongly in relation to the upcoming administrative-territorial reform in 2007 (see Bulletin No. 9).

Another restructuring is expected on the relationship between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the President. Discussions are taking place in Parliament regarding 29 amendments to the Law of KG “On the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic”. These are concentrated on issues concerning the competence of executive, legislative branches of government and the President with a view to distribution of powers to appointed officials. At present the discussion is focused among others on the role of the President in forming the Government and in what degree the Prime Minister will be unrestricted in forming his team. This issue will be finally resolved by the referendum on Constitutional reform. It is obvious that the next issue to be addressed is the system of checks and balances between local self-government and rayon state administrations.

A distinguishing feature in this period is that to a great extent the local factor already prompts the higher bodies of authority to correct decisions that were taken. At this time, it is difficult to judge whether or not it is an indication of weakness of authority, since not enough time has passed since the time of the presidential election. It is obvious that to avoid escalation of conflicts, the leadership of the country prefers being more patient, avoiding simpler but more harsh types of problem resolution and also attempts to prevent growth of dissatisfaction by efforts of building dialogue or waiting for further development. Frequently the situation is complicated because the Government of Kyrgyzstan often appears to be “between two fires”. They are under pressure from protest groups on the one hand, and are accused by the population of weakness of authority on the other hand. Situations such as the seizure of Kara-Keche or criminalization in Osh oblast have already shown that the authority of executive authorities (in particular law enforcement bodies) in some regions of the country, have been truncated in a significant degree and taken over by other elements. In Jalalabad oblast, conflicts related to the distribution of land plots by heads of Ayil Okmotu, have developed into interclan and interethnic conflicts (see Bulletin No. 8 and 9). The statement by the head of the President’s Administration of the President, Sydykov U., that “the structure of the government of Kyrgyzstan will

be submitted to national parliament after September 10" (www.pr.kg – 05/09/05) gives the impression that efforts are being undertaken to demonstrate that the President's Administration is taking measures for a gradual stabilization of the situation at all levels. This would also indicate that changes at the local level could be expected.

However, in reality contradicting local specifics can complicate the situation.

- In Jalalabad oblast, the local population expresses dissatisfaction with the employment of officials in the local state administration that used to work there during the presidency of Akaev, and were recently re-employed (see weekly overview). In general in Jalalabad oblast, dissatisfaction of the population with hiring policies is observed and discussions reach the point of considering a possible "second challenge" or "second street march", in the sense of a second wave of replacement of at least local level authorities.
- In Batken oblast dissatisfaction is also expressed, but the situation here is different. The population is discontented with the dominant status and "pressure" from the officials who took posts after the 2005 March events. Confrontations show rivalry between two groups which participated in the March events: one supporting the acting governor of Batken oblast, Sultan Aijigitov, and the other group supporting Abdybakir Imarov, the former head of the Coordination council in Batken oblast (in fact he was the head of oblast immediately after the March events). The background for the confrontations is the elections, which took place after March 24 at Sydykov, when Aijigitov S. was elected as head of the oblast by "the people". Imarov's supporters consider that Imarov was unfairly eliminated.
- In Osh oblast, intensification of the attitude of criticism of the population towards the representatives of the top levels of the country's government is observed. During the demonstrations in Osh and Kara-Suu that took place the day after Junusov's murder, participants addressed acting vice-prime minister Madumarov A. and General Public Prosecutor Beknazarov B. and accused them of supporting gangsterism and criminal elements (slogans to this effect were written on leaflets and placards). It is worth noting that Madumarov M., along with the whole group of parliament members and members of Government, was criticized by Beknazarov A. for participation in "doubtful activities" (www.pr.kg – 26/09/05), i.e. participation in the celebrations devoted to national hero Er-Tabyldy. This event was arranged at Issyk-Kul by citizen Akmatbaev R. (the brother of parliament member Akmatbaev T.), who is currently under investigation by the police, but who appealed to the General Public Prosecutor to "vindicate himself in the public opinion" (newspaper "Delo №" of June 29, 2005).
- The tendency is different in other oblasts. Of the northern regions, at the present moment, the electorate of Talas shows the most noticeable tendency for tribal divisions. The intensity of divisions occurs as a rule against a background of elections of deputies to the parliament (in constituency № 54).

In general, and connected to the planned administrative-territorial reform, it is possible to foresee throughout the country increased conflict potential resulting from a restructuring of the system of checks and balances of state government bodies and all other levels of governance. This process will take place against a background of raised importance of local factors, such as personal sympathies of the local population (especially the Ayil Okmotu constituency) towards concrete political figures; clan and interethnic relations; access to political and financial resources (including for and through relatives); and utilization of the factor of connection to Akaev's presidency.

Overall, the prognosis can be made that the authorities will display a tendency towards centralizing power for greater control of the local situation and for reacting to local initiatives, that in southern regions criminal structures will oppose the authorities and possible attempts to construct dialogue, and that conflicts may occur within the government structure itself.

Lately, publicly expressed protests have become an effective method to begin a dialogue between authorities and protesting groups, confirmed by precedents (ex. Kara-Keche, Barskoon, land

claimants). In cases when another part of the population is opposed to the protest group, (ex. land claimants), the authority is put “between two fires”. Should authorities take the side of one of the parties, it will only strengthen confrontations and will provoke greater division of the population into groups. The greatest efforts of the authorities should be spent not so much on solving the problem, but on maintaining the balance, relative stability or even authority itself. The situation at present is already strained due to division of the population into various political (ex. in Batken), religious (ex. in Issyk-Kul oblast), clan (ex. in Talas oblast), criminal (ex. in Osh oblast), and ethnic (ex. in Jalalabad and Batken oblasts) groups, that are competing among each other. With the realization of the announced administrative-territorial reform, when the rayon will become the highest local level, a proportional increase in conflicts at the rayon level will possibly occur, to which authorities will have difficulties to react adequately and timely. Some sites, such as Kara-Keche today, can become uncontrollable for the authorities and potential use of force to solve the issue can only lead to an escalation of conflicts.

5. Brief summary of events and trends in August 2005

The month August passed without serious incidents of violence, while several long-standing conflicts continued. Eleven publicly expressed conflict events involving discontented population groups were reported in the weekly bulletins. Discontent was expressed by demonstrations (nine), blockades of a market (two), attempt to remove a Kyrgyz border post (one) and seizure of a private building (one). Most of these events took place in Jalalabad oblast (five) and in Bishkek (five). In Bishkek all events were related to land claimants. Next to that there were three economic conflicts (working conditions Kyrgyzpostachy, demand for re-nationalization of Kyrgyzkhopok, competing markets in Jalalabad), one election-related conflict (elections of Osh mayor), one conflict on hiring policy (of Osh oblast governor) and one conflict regarding legal procedures (investigation of the embezzlement from Jalalabad branch of National Bank).

Several earlier reported conflicts continued during August. High levels of tension were not only noted in relation to the land claimants who now attempt to draw in President Bakiev, but also in relation to the Railroad, Kara Keche coalmine and Kumtor goldmine – although in the latter cases particular events involving conflict and/or violence were not observed. Two railroad workers had threatened to commit suicide during the Inauguration of the President, but refrained after promises that President Bakiev would personally engage in the conflict. Several demands of the population of Jeti-Oguz rayon towards Kumtor goldmine and the government have been met. In Kara Keche the situation remained as it was, but increasing stakes of the groups and individuals involved may lead to an aggravation in the near future.

Observed trends which may lead to further tensions and conflicts in the future, include land allocation initiatives on ayil okmotu level in relation to the planned administrative-territorial re-arrangements, demands for redistribution of property of private enterprises, intensification of activities of religious groups in Osh and Issyk-kul oblast (causing tensions among the population in Issyk-kul oblast), and hiring policies of the government. Uzbekistan demonstrated dissatisfaction with Kyrgyzstan’s handling of the refugee situation by its intention to re-establish border posts and by discontinuing the contract for gas supply to northern Kyrgyzstan.

6. Recommendations

For resolution of the situation at “Kara-Keche”

- *The Government* – the recommendations provided in Bulletin No. 9 remain valid;
- *The Prime Minister* – to visit Kara-Keche to mitigate tensions and develop an action plan;

- *The NGOs* – **a)** jointly with “Joomart” group, to develop a plan for legal training seminars on relevant themes, that are of interest to members of the “Joomart” movement; **b)** to conduct seminars with the purpose of re-orienting members of the “Joomart” group to legal methods of problem solving, and of increasing their interest in the political path of development for their movement as well as in abstaining from the use of force when solving problems.

For resolution of the problem regarding intra-industrial conflicts related to change of managements and/or owners

- *The Government* – **a)** to appoint a separate investigation group specializing in investigation of intra-industrial conflicts connected with a change of management and/or owners; **b)** to inform the public about the course of investigations and about the state of relationships of conflicting parties.
- *NGOs* – to provide informational support to the parties in conflict about the legal basis of their dispute.

For resolution of the problem regarding increasing criminalization in the southern regions

- *The Government, NGOs* – to concentrate their activities on orienting the youth, especially those who intend to move from the countryside to the oblast centers (in particular to Osh city) on legal types of activity, such as labor migration, self-help groups, micro-credit unions, and so to prevent the youth from joining criminal groups.

7. Announcements

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The previously issued weekly bulletins are available on the website www.fti.org.kg .

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Intervention Database: The Early Warning for Violence Prevention Project appeals to organizations and individuals interested in organizing conflict mitigation activities to register in the Project database. The database will allow us to promptly engage you in the development and implementation of violence prevention measures.

Rapid Reaction Emergency Fund: The Early Warning for Violence Prevention Project is also announcing a small grant program intended for implementation conflict and violence prevention measures. More information can be found on the website www.fti.org.kg.

For more information about the Database and Emergency Fund please contact Violetta Yan at: 264/27 Manaschi Sagynbaya, phone: 996 (312) 64-43-60, 64-46-58, fax: 996 (312) 64-44-63, e-mail: fti@infotel.kg

About the Project:

The Early Warning for Violence Prevention Project was initiated to prevent violence related to political conflicts by creating a mechanism of forecasting/investigating conflicts and implementing appropriate preventive measures. The project is initiated by the Foundation for Tolerance International and the International Foundation IFES and supported by OSCE, UNDP, and the Swiss and US governments. The project started in June 2005.

In order to closely monitor the situation in the country, the Project created a national network of monitors selected among active members of the civil society and representatives of academic circles, media and law enforcement agencies. Overall, 36 monitors observe the situation throughout the country and maintain permanent communication with the Center for Early Warning.

The Center for Early Warning processes the information collected, prepares recommendations on interventions needed for violence prevention, and publishes a Weekly Bulletin.

The Early Intervention Component develops and implements action plans aimed at prevention of violence in close collaboration with governmental bodies, NGOs and international organizations. The Project also offers small grants for implementation of violence prevention measures.